

PRISM

Power & the Humanities

Redrawing the Lines of Power

BY SHARON JANSEN

Let us now sing the praises of famous men, the heroes of our nation's history, through whom the Lord established his renown, and revealed his majesty in each succeeding age. Some held sway over kingdoms and made themselves a name by their exploits. . . . There are others who are unremembered; they are dead, and it is as though they had never existed, as though they had never been born or left children to succeed them.

- Ecclesiasticus 44:1-3, 9

"Despite the ordinary descent of political power from one man to another, an extraordinary series of dynastic "accidents" in early modern Europe resulted in a surprising number of women ruling as queens or functioning as regents."

Like the list of "famous men" compiled by the author of *Ecclesiasticus* (Abraham, the father of Isaac, Isaac of Jacob; Moses and his brother Aaron; David, the father of Solomon, Solomon of Rehoboam), the political history of western Europe has focused on generations of men. Biographies, genealogies, and family trees trace lines of power from fathers to sons and grandsons, brothers and nephews. During the period of English history with which I am most familiar, for example, Edward III is followed on the throne by his grandson Richard II; Henry IV is followed by his son Henry V, who is followed, in turn, by his son Henry VI; Edward IV was to have been followed by his son, who would have been the fifth English Edward, but instead is succeeded by his brother, Richard III; Henry VII is followed by his son Henry VIII, who is followed by his son Edward VI. But then, something strange happens to this list of "famous men." At his death in 1553, Edward VI is succeeded by his sister, Mary I. Mary is followed on the throne by Elizabeth I.

The succession of a woman to the throne of England horrified many, including the Protestant reformer John Knox, who concluded that any woman who presumed to "sit in the seat of God, that is, to teach, to judge, or to reign above a man" was "a monster in nature." Women were incapable of effective rule, for "nature . . . doth paint them forth to be weak, frail, impudent, feeble, and foolish, and experience hath declared them to be unconstant, variable, cruel, and lacking the spirit of counsel and regiment." Knox summarized his opposition to female rule in a single memorable sentence:

"To promote a woman to bear rule, superiority, dominion, or empire above any realm, nation, or city, is repugnant to nature, contumely to God, a thing most contrarious to His revealed will and approved ordinance, and finally it is the subversion of good order of all equity and justice."

Knox published *The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* in 1558, and his blistering polemic was quickly followed at print by a series of pamphlets that echoed and expanded his argument that female rule was unnatural, unlawful, and contrary to Scripture. From Knox's point of view, the political situation could hardly seem worse. Not only had Mary Tudor succeeded to the throne of England, but Mary Stuart, wife of the dauphin of France, had become queen of Scotland, while her mother, Mary of Guise, was acting as regent in Scotland on Mary's behalf. Unfortunately for Knox, though, the political situation could get worse, and did, almost immediately. While Mary Tudor died only a few months after the *Blast* appeared, her half-sister Elizabeth succeeded her as queen of England. In France, following the death of her husband Henry II, Catherine de'Medici attempted to become regent of France for her son, Francis II. Outmaneuvered in 1559, she succeeded a year later when Francis died and the dowager queen



A Word from the Editorial Board

Lord Acton famously observed, in what has now become a ringing cliché, "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." Adding a local wrinkle to Acton's universal dictum, John Kenneth Galbraith suggested that "in the United States, though power corrupts, the expectation of power paralyzes." Less pessimistically—perhaps because he was more a novelist than a politician—the French writer Stendhal asserted that "power, after love, is the first source of happiness." All seem to strike somewhere near the truth, but where exactly does that leave us? Corruption? Paralysis? Happiness? Power is certainly a central and perennial human concern, but it is not altogether clear how we value it. Nor is it always clear just how we locate and define it.

The articles in this issue of *Prism* address those questions from a number of perspectives within the Humanities, reflecting on how power has been theorized, deployed, or resisted; how it manifests itself in institutional systems or plays out in individual lives. Sharon Jansen begins with a radical re-configuring of the lines of power (the topic of her new book under contract with St. Martin's Press) when she reinstalls women in the genealogies of European monarchies. Jim Albrecht follows with a suggestive conversation between Michel Foucault, one of the late twentieth century's most imaginative theorists of power, and the American pragmatists Ralph Waldo Emerson and William James. He finds in these nineteenth-century Americans a bracing alternative to Foucault's vision.

Maria Lacabe moves from the theoretical to the actual with her personal narrative of an encounter with a very real embodiment of power in Franco's Spain. And Paul Berman takes us in another direction with his chapel talk on Job, Jesus, and Walt Whitman: not terrorizing others, but transforming others through the quiet power of being available to them.

Mark Jensen's contribution takes the form of a book review and focuses on John Updike's Rabbit novels as a site for dramatizing the price men pay for having been the dominant gender in a traditionally patriarchal culture. Dick Olufs, from his perspective as a political scientist, casts a critical eye on the complicated but inevitable intersection of power and justice within another of America's traditions, that of liberal democracy.

The internationally respected Trinidadian writer Earl Lovelace joins the PLU English faculty next year, and we are delighted to be able to include an excerpt from his new prize-winning novel, *Salt*. In this passage, one of the selections from his campus reading last fall, he describes in dizzying color and rhythm the triumphant realization that in spite of colonialism's four hundred-year exercise of power, "you can't keep people in captivity."

We hope that these reflections on power will suggest some of the ways it has been a part of our lives and our history.

Having been so long in ascendancy, patriarchal ideology has also determined the interpretation and recording of history. Therefore, we women must reclaim history, exposing the myths that distort our experiences and limit our vision of our capabilities.

Mary Bricker-Jenkins

assumed the regency for her second son, Charles IX. Thus England, Scotland, and France were under the direct "regiment" of women.

Despite arguments like Knot's against female rule, and despite the ordinary descent of political power from one man to another, an extraordinary series of dynastic "accidents" in early modern Europe resulted in a surprising number of women ruling as queens or functioning as regents. In a project tentatively titled *The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe*, I recently set out to analyze the violent partisan attacks on "gynocracy" penned by Knott, Anthony Gilby, Christopher Goodman, Jean Bodin, Robert Filmer and Bishop Jacques Bossuet, among others, as well as the defenses of female rule published to counter their extreme, sometimes violent, positions. Against this background, I planned to write a series of biographical portraits of the remarkable women whose "regent" had inspired the debate—Knott's so-called "monsters in nature."

I was at first afraid that I might not find enough female rulers to make my project worthwhile. Aside from the English Mary and Elizabeth, the Scottish

Mary Stuart, and Catherine de' Medici, I knew only of Margaret of Austria, who had been regent of the Netherlands, and Jeanne d'Albret, the Protestant Queen of Navarre, whose son had become Henry IV, King of France. But the more I thought about it, the more I realized that these women weren't the first powerful women in early modern Europe. I decided I should really begin by focusing on the lives of four formidable women who died early in the sixteenth century: Isabella of Spain (d. 1504), who inherited the throne of Castile; Lady Margaret Beaufort (d. 1509), who chose not to press her own claims to the English throne in order to promote the cause of her son, Henry Tudor; Caterina Sforza (d. 1509), who seized power in Imola and Forlì to preserve it for her son, Ottaviano; and Anne of France (d. 1522), who acted as a shrewd and politically adept regent for her brother, Charles VIII. The careers of these powerful and successful women seemed to me to provide models for the women who were to follow in the next generation.

As I worked, I found more and more women to include in my project, too many women, in fact, instead of too few. The women assumed political

power in succeeding generations in England, Scotland, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Italy were far more numerous—and more successful—than I had imagined; I have already found more than thirty women whose stories I could (and should) tell. Even more surprising than their numbers and their successes, however, was how their names and stories had almost disappeared from the history of early modern Europe. Aside from Queen Isabella, who had funded the voyage of Columbus, "Bloody Mary," good Queen Bess, and the romantic Mary, Queen of Scots, most of us know relatively little about any of these "monstrous" women.

Searching the indexes of political histories and biographies, I began to find the names of women I knew nothing about—but I could find little more than their names at first. How many Blanca's of Navarre were there? How many Isabellas of Aragon? Of Castile? Of Portugal? Were Charlotte of Savoy and Bona of Savoy related? If so, how? How did Louise of Savoy fit in? (Where is Savoy, anyway?) Could Anne of France and Anne of Beaujeu be the same woman? What about Mary of Guise and Mary of Lorraine? And why was all this so difficult for me to sort out? The relationships and connections linking these women couldn't be more complicated than those of the eight Henrys, six Edwards and three Richards I knew so well; the English line of succession from the twelfth through the sixteenth centuries has always been easier for me to recite than the names and dates of American presidents. But it was hard to find out much about these Annes, Elizabeths, Marys, and Margarets in traditional political history. Like the "unremembered" others in Ecclesiastes, it was almost as if they "had never existed, as though they had never been born or left children to succeed them."

But clearly they had been born, and equally clearly they had left children to succeed them. And so, trying to figure out who these women were and whether and how they were related, I began to focus on the family trees in the books I had in front of me. And that's when I began to notice what (or who) was missing.

Like the generations of "famous men" in Ecclesiastes—Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and David, Solomon, Rehoboam—one Henry or Louis followed another in succession, father and son, springing forth as if by spontaneous generation. I searched in vain for women: wives and mothers were simply absent from many of the genealogies appended to the histories and biographies I was reading. I think my favorite is a Valois "family tree" that charts four branches of the family over the course of nearly four hundred years. It looks as if the line of Valois kings (from 1328 through 1547, anyway)—Philip VI, John II, Charles V, Charles VI, Charles VII, Louis XI, Charles VIII, Louis XII, Francis I—managed to do without any wives or mothers at all. Then again, maybe I like best the Habsburg genealogy that begins in 950 and covers five centuries

before noting that one Habsburg, the Emperor Frederick III, had a wife, Eleanor of Portugal; she may have had something to do with the birth of Frederick's son, the future Emperor Maximilian I, in 1459.

Meanwhile, in England, the five daughters of Edward III (r. 1327–77) are all too often lumped together at the end of the genealogical line as "daughters," but that at least is an improvement over the tables that chart the descendants of his sons without noting that he had any "daughters" at all. I imagine that "issue," as it often appears on these family trees, could include insignificant males as well as females, but I am suspicious that "other issue" refers exclusively to daughters.

Of course not all the family trees omit women. The "Kings and Queens of England" poster that is hanging right next to me as I type indicates the wives of Edwards I through III, Henry IV and V, Henry VII and Henry VIII (all six). But why isn't the wife of Henry VI included, especially since she was the strong and powerful Margaret of Anjou (Shakespeare's "tiger's heart wrapped in a woman's hide")? Edward IV and Richard III are also missing their wives, as is James V of Scotland and his grandson James VI, who becomes James I of England. Then again, to be absolutely fair, while Mary Tudor's husband (Philip II of Spain) is listed, Mary Stuart's husbands, all three of them (Francis, Darnley, Bothwell), are eliminated. Still, this version of the poster is a marked improvement over the previous edition, which left out the wives of Edwards I through III, Henry IV and V as well as Henry VI, and limited Henry VIII to only three of his six wives. If there are rules to determine when women are included and when they are omitted in such genealogies, I haven't been able to figure out what they are.

Still, I must admit I took unexpected pleasure in some of the inconsistencies I found. The Oxford History of England's volume of *The Earlier Tudors* eliminated all six of Henry VIII's wives, and while I am, in general, frustrated that so many women have disappeared from royal family trees, I was delighted to see that Henry's entire matrimonial career had been wiped out. Interestingly, his sisters Margaret and Mary were accompanied by their husbands; Margaret got both of hers, James IV of Scotland and Archibald, earl of Angus, but Mary got only her second, Charles, duke of Brandon—I don't know why she didn't she didn't get to keep her king, Louis XII of France. Henry, for whatever reason, hadn't been allowed to keep even a single wife. He looked almost lonely.

Even the most complete family trees, one tracing the Medici family from Giovanni di Bicci (1360–1423) and his wife Piccarda Bueri through Giovanni Gastone (1671–1737) and his wife Anne of Saxe-Lauenburg, for example, work patrilineally,



The queens in history compare favorably with the kings.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton

If things were even worse than they are after all this war they might have laid the blame upon the rule of a woman; but if such persons are honest they should blame only the rule of men who desire to play the part of kings. In future, if I am not any more hampered, I hope to show that women have a more sincere determination to preserve the country than those who have plunged it into the miserable condition to which it has been brought.

Catherine de' Medici

tracing descent through the male line. Men's names are set in capital letters or boldfaced or highlighted; their wives' names, when included, are smaller, underneath the names, dates, and titles of the men to whom they are connected, or off to the side, after "et" or "=" to indicate their status as wives. When women marry into a family, their names suddenly appear—but where did these women come from? Who were their grandmothers, their mothers, their sisters? And when women marry out of the family, where do they go? Their names are left dangling on the trees of their families, dead ends on the lines of descent.

And so, out of frustration and desperation, trying to see the connections between these "unremembered" others, I set out to draw my own family trees, linking women, generations of mothers and daughters, aunts and nieces. I searched—not always successfully—for the dates of their birth, the dates of their death, the children who had succeeded them. As I drew and then redrew my new genealogical tables, I came to see not a series of individual, isolated women who came from nowhere to be swallowed up in the Tudor, Valois, Habsburg, or Medici families, but networks of related women and patterns of connections between them.

And once I had redrawn the lines, something quite unexpected emerged. Women like Mary Tudor no longer looked like a "monster in nature" who had suddenly appeared out of nowhere to seize hold of power. Mary Tudor's mother, Catherine of Aragon, was not only Henry VIII's first wife, but the first woman to have been officially designated as regent of England; Catherine, in her turn, was the daughter of Isabella, Queen of Castile, who herself was the niece of Maria of Castile, Governor of Aragon, and granddaughter of Catherine of Lancaster, Regent of Castile. Isabella's elder daughter, Juana (Catherine of Aragon's sister), inherited the crowns of both Castile and Aragon; Isabella's granddaughters included Isobel of Portugal, Regent of Spain, Mary of Austria, Regent of the Netherlands, and Catherine, Regent of Portugal; among her great-granddaughters were Margaret of Parma, Regent of the Netherlands, and Joanna of Spain, Regent of Spain.


It was Isabella's grandson, the Emperor Charles V, who appointed his aunt, Margaret of Austria, to be Regent of the Netherlands; Margaret's mother, Mary, had been the duchess of Burgundy, heir in her own right to the rich province so important as the balance of power shifted between France and England during the fifteenth century. Margaret administered the Netherlands for her nephew from 1519 until her death in 1536, when she was followed as regent by Charles's sister, Mary of Austria. Mary functioned as regent for more than twenty years, from 1530 to 1552, when she ceded power to Charles's son, Philip II, who in 1559 appointed his half-sister, Margaret of Parma (Charles's illegitimate daughter) as regent. Margaret left the regency after 1567, but resumed it again in 1580, serving until she retired once more in 1583.

And I began to see significant connections and relationships beyond those of blood. Margaret of Austria, for example, had been betrothed at age three to Charles, the dauphin of France; in 1483 she had been sent to the French court where, for ten years,

her care and education were directed by the extraordinary Anne of France, regent for her brother Charles. The betrothal didn't result in marriage; instead, in 1497, Margaret was sent to the court of Isabella of Castile, marrying John, heir to his mother Isabella's Castile and his father Ferdinand's Aragon. How can we calculate the influence of two such politically adept women on Margaret, who would function so successfully as regent for her nephew? And what kind of influence does Margaret herself exert on a young Anne Boleyn, the woman who was to become Henry VIII's second wife and the mother of Elizabeth II? In 1513, Anne was sent as maid of honor to Margaret's Habsburg court, where, according to one recent biographer, she was "educated alongside Europe's rulers of the next generation."

From Margaret's court, Anne was sent to the French court, where she spent the next seven years. There she would witness first-hand the influence of Louise of Savoy on her son, Francis I. Immediately following his accession to the throne, the new French king empowered his mother, as Regent of France, to handle affairs of state; she became regent again, ten years later, when Francis was held captive in Spain by the Emperor Charles V. I was amazed when I learned that Louise of Savoy, like Margaret of Austria, had been educated by Anne of France, and that, with Margaret of Austria, she negotiated the so-called "Ladies' Peace" in 1529, ending the hostilities between her son Francis and Margaret's nephew Charles.

Genealogy Chart




If all this seems confusing, you can see why I needed to redraw family trees. Instead of focusing on kings and their sons, my royal genealogies moved backward and forward, tracing queens and their grandmothers, mothers, aunts, sisters, daughters, nieces, granddaughters, and grandnieces. I have to admit I enjoyed the process. I made the names of the four women I had selected as models big—really big, with bold boxes around them. Isabella of Castile overpowers her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon. She also overshadows him—wherever I could, I put my women on top. I also eliminated every son I could, including Henry VIII's long-desired Edward VI, as "issue" with which I was not concerned. I kept only those through whom lines of power descended to a woman. The men's names that remain on my redrawn genealogies are so tiny I can't read them without my glasses. It's somehow very satisfying to see Henry VIII looking so small. Instead of Francis I and Charles V looming so large on the scene, you see women—generations and generations of women of power.

You can also see the shifting political alliances of early modern Europe from a very different (and revealing) perspective. As I drew my new family trees, I realized that the lines of power in early modern European political history look very different if you connect women instead of men. Men like John Knox might argue against women's right and fitness to rule, but women had and could and did rule—and rule well—even as they were being

told they could not and should not.

And so, in addition to analyzing the arguments articulated in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and early seventeenth centuries in order to understand the opposition to female rule, I have come to reflect on the ways our own notions of politics and power have been defined not only by conventional political history and biography but also by the lists of "famous men" we have constructed, lists that have "revealed" majesty in each succeeding age, lists that have told us who "held sway over kingdoms." My project, when it is complete, will construct politics and power from a different perspective—by focusing on the lives and relationships of women, those "others" who did exist, those others who—like theirs fathers, husbands, and sons—did "hold sway" over kingdoms and make themselves names "by their exploits," who did leave children to succeed them, and who, though dead, should not be "unremembered."

By the way, after thinking about it for some time now, I have decided to let Henry VIII keep two of his six wives—Catherine of Aragon and Anne Boleyn, strong and determined mothers whose daughters became queens. ■



Pragmatism and Power: Foucault, Emerson, and James

BY JIM ALBRECHT

"Emerson and James consistently affirm that the structures of society, even as they constrain us to work with and against them, provide sufficient possibilities for transformative action."

The concept of "power," in the realm of literary and cultural studies, has become almost inescapably linked with Michel Foucault, particularly with the specific political turn that Foucault gives to the concept of power that he inherited from Friedrich Nietzsche. A largely suppressed precursor in this philosophic genealogy is Ralph Waldo Emerson, who, as recent scholarship has increasingly stressed,¹ had a significant influence on Nietzsche. Yet the view of power articulated in Emerson—and in the tradition of American pragmatism, exemplified by William James, that extends from Emerson—is often overlooked, or worse, dismissed as naïve. In this piece, I want to suggest that the trajectory of American pragmatism leading from Emerson through James offers a politically important alternative to the Foucauldian view of power. Perhaps Foucault's central insight is that the generative and constricting aspects of power are inseparable from each other: the system of social relations that generates knowledge and utility is simultaneously a system of subjection and discipline. This view of power creates a mandate to analyze how any concept or cultural practice is connected to power relations in society—a mandate which explains the considerable political value of Foucault's work for scholars in the humanities. Yet despite his insistence that power is not merely repressive, but generative, Foucault's work paints the picture of a modern society in which the mechanisms of power are ever more pervasive, effective, and insidious in their control over our lives. Following the wisdom that "just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you," some would argue that this dark vision is essential to Foucault's political usefulness. But this vision of power has serious political limitations, I believe, to the extent that it diminishes our ability to imagine culture as offering possibilities and resources for transformative action. Both Emerson and James share Foucault's tough-minded insistence that all human "truths" and actions are inescapably implicated in existing social structures, and thus in the iniquities of power relationships. For pragmatism, as for Foucault, culture is always a contested zone: it constrains us, it empowers us.

Crucially, however, Emerson and James consistently affirm that the structures of society, even as they constrain us to work with and against them, provide sufficient possibilities for

transformative action. Though Emerson and James acknowledge that the results of all transformative acts will in turn be implicated in new power relations, they do not stress the inevitable subjection that dominates Foucault's vision; rather, they see culture as a medium whose generative powers can be appropriated by, or facilitated by, our human wills and our moral purposes.

Foucault's central inheritance from Nietzsche is the critique of absolute truth, the insistence that truth must be re-conceived in terms of its relation to power. Like Nietzsche, he argues that truth is wholly a product of the material world, and must be analyzed in terms of its effects in that world:


truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true.²

In Foucault, the critique of truth thus becomes a study of the practices of power: investigating the historical development of such concepts as "madness," "sexuality," or the "individual," he focuses on the procedures and relations of power connected with the social institutions and practices that produce and use knowledge. Specifically, his work explores the new "regime" of "disciplinary" power that gained ascendancy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that characterizes our modern era. In this regime, power is not merely—or even primarily—the repressive power wielded by a centralized "State." Power is rather manifested in the entire decentralized network of social relations through which people's bodies are trained, educated, and controlled: a system of practices developed in a variety of institutions, such as schools, hospitals, the military, the workshop/factory, and prisons.

This concept of disciplinary power allows Foucault to advance an important revision of the view of power shared, in different forms, by both a liberal critique of totalitarianism and a Marxist critique of capitalism: namely, that power is a repressive force that distorts and opposes truth in order to serve the interests of a ruling class. Instead, Foucault insists, power is both repressive and generative, producing knowledge and economic utilities. The mechanisms of disciplinary power, he argues, have generated immense economic wealth:

¹ For example, see George J. Stack, *Nietzsche and Emerson: An Active Affinity* (Columbus: Ohio UP, 1992); Michael Lopez, *Emerson and Power: Creative Analogies in the Nineteenth Century* (Burlington, VT: Birkhäuser, 1990), and a forthcoming special issue of *ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance*, devoted to Emerson and Nietzsche.

² Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 131. All further references to this editor will be cited parenthetically in the body of the text, by the abbreviation "Fouc."



trained, evaluated, and controlled bodies are productive bodies. They also have generated related fields of knowledge by establishing procedures of observation and evaluation—in schools and hospitals, factories and prisons—that spurred the development of a whole range of sciences dealing with human personality. This emphasis on the generative nature of power leads Foucault to revise the traditional Marxist notion of power as a means of "ideological" control, along with the related view of culture as a realm of false consciousness, for such a view implies the naive idea that truth could exist outside society's systems of control and production: "The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult, [for] it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as 'truth'" (PK 118).

Instead, Foucault offers a nuanced and sophisticated vision of culture as a contested zone in which people are simultaneously empowered and demarcated. Indeed, he stresses that disciplinary power is so effective precisely because it controls not by merely repressing people's energies and impulses, but by training and controlling them. Crucially, such power is not simply the arm of a monolithic dominant class, but a system in which we become the agents of our own subjection: we "are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power" (PK 98), participating in the disciplinary practices that help us create knowledge and wealth even as they subject us. The very sciences which have given rise to our modern concepts of character and personality, as well as the methods of education and training that help us to be productive individuals, are simultaneously methods of social control by which we are judged, normalized, and awarded social benefits or punishments. (Those of us who are teachers might take pause at Foucault's discussion of the examination as a method of disciplinary power!) Our most cherished ideas of human personality and agency—such as the "individual" and the "soul"—must be seen, at least in part, as "effects" of knowledge generated by the methods of discipline that control and train the body's productive forces: "it is always the body that is at issue—the body and its forces, their utility and docility, their distribution and their submission," an insight encapsulated in Foucault's provocative inversion, "The soul is the prison of the body" (DP 25, 30).

There is much about this complex reconception of power that is politically valuable. Foucault's relentless insistence that we reject the notion of any human truth that would be free of the effects of power, or the notion of a self whose acts could unequivocally serve freedom and oppose power, is a habit of mind that may help us avoid the naivete or blindnesses inherent in traditional concepts of truth, individuality, and freedom. Moreover, if Foucault demands that we consider the power relations that shape any cultural concept or discourse, he controversially warns against any reductive analysis that

would debunk culture as simply repressive. While this is a welcome energization of the Marxist tendency to view culture as a realm of ideological control, Foucault's concept of disciplinary power still remains closest to a Gramscian-Marxist concept of hegemony: a system of control that is insidiously effective because it induces us to participate in our own oppression. Simply stated, it becomes hard to imagine where in Foucault's vision there exists any human agency—individual or collective—that is sufficient to facilitate meaningful social change. In his zeal to avoid the idealizations of Western individualism, he runs the risk of an opposite determinism, of essentializing the mechanisms of disciplinary power into a totalizing system that wholly controls the possibilities of human agency.

To insist that even our efforts of resistance cannot escape the network of power they hope to transform need not imply a political pessimism: on the contrary, it can be viewed as inspiring a practical activism by fixing a concrete target and strategy for action. There is, Foucault insists, a "battle" to be waged "around truth": "it's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power), but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time" (PK 132). Though we cannot ever free truth from power relations, we can, by accepting how truth is implicated in power, focus on analyzing and changing the ways that truth functions in specific social contexts. Yet if Foucault endorses struggle within and against specific institutional forms of power, the overriding tenor of his work portrays society as dominated by an ever more effective and pervasive system of disciplinary power. This darkness of Foucault's vision, I believe, is a political liability, to the extent that it threatens the politically necessary belief in the transformative potential of human action.

Pragmatism constitutes a valuable remedy to a Foucauldian pessimism because, as William James defines it, pragmatism explicitly aims to avoid, or mediate between, the opposing excesses of an idealistic defense of free will and a materialistic determinism. James instead advocates a "radical empiricism," which emphasizes in insisting that reality be measured wholly in terms of material experience, yet is more "radically" empiricist than a mechanistic materialism, because it also insists on the material reality of human ideas, beliefs, and desires, and the role they play in the creation of new truth. The enduring political value of pragmatism lies precisely in this balance: like Foucault, pragmatism insists that human truth and agency are wholly grounded in—and thus limited by—material, historical circumstances. Yet pragmatism also insists that our material circumstances allow for change, facilitated by our desires and actions, that is sufficient to our moral and political needs. Too often, pragmatism is subjected to one of two opposing interpreta-

¹ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979 [1975]), pp. 184–94. All further references to this edition will be cited parenthetically in the body of the text, by the abbreviation "PK."

² James remet, with some reservation, that he defense of belief had been dismally labeled as the "will to believe" or the "will to make believe"; see *The Writings of William James*, A Comprehensive Edition, 2d ed. by John J. McDermott (Chicago: Chicago U.P., 1977) [1963], p. 417. All further references to this edition will be cited parenthetically in the body of the text, by the abbreviation "W&J." For a discussion of such criticisms of James, see Ellen Kappy Sudik, *The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame U.P., 1982), pp. 73, 85-7, 143 (notes 11-12), and 164 (notes 35-7).

³ Louis Mumford, "The Pragmatic Renaissance," in *The Golden Day: A Study in American Experience and Culture* (New York: Harcourt and World, 1926), 157-68. Also see Mumford's subsequent exchange with John Dewey collected in *Pragmatism and American Culture*, ed. Gott Kennedy (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1965), pp. 49-57.

⁴ Stephen E. Whicher, *Freedom and Fate: An Inner Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania U.P., 1958). For an excellent survey of Emerson criticism, see Lopez, *Emerson and Power*, chapters II and 6.

⁵ Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Conservatives," in *Essays and Lectures* (New York: Library of America, 1980), p. 576. All further references to this edition will be cited parenthetically in the body of the text, by the abbreviation "E&L."



tions, both of which overlook this balance which lies at the heart of James' philosophy. By some, James has been accused of a naive voluntarism that unrigorously asserts the reality of will, belief, and freedom.⁴ Others, most famously Lewis Mumford, have accused his pragmatism of exactly the opposite: of renouncing the transformative power of human imagination and "acquiescing" to material reality.⁵ It is no accident that James's precursor Emerson has suffered from similarly contradictory readings: as the title of Stephen Whicher's influential study *Freedom and Fate* indicates, critics have charted in Emerson's career a radical shift from a naive affirmation of individual power to a deterministic acceptance of limitation.⁶ Seen more accurately, both Emerson and James acknowledge the constraining limitations of social power, while also affirming the power of our efforts to appropriate, resist, and transform those constricting social structures.

Emerson depicts culture as both the source of humankind's immense creative power, and as a force of restrictive conformity. Contrary to the prevalent view that he celebrates the self's autonomy, Emerson is acutely aware that the linguistic basis of human intelligence—what he often terms "Society"—makes all our actions, thoughts, and perceptions socially dependent. "[S]o deep is the foundation of the existing social system," he insists, "that it leaves no one out of it"; those who "quarrel with the arrangements of society are 'under the necessity of using the Actual order of things, in order to disuse it."⁷ Culture makes available to us the myriad results of others' actions; it provides us with tools to use and examples of actors to emulate: "How easily we adopt their labors! Every ship that comes to America got its chart from Columbus. Every novel is a debtor to Homer. Every carpenter who shaves with a foreplane borrows the genius of a forgotten inventor" (E&L, 620). Yet it is precisely because culture offers to do so much for us that it also threatens to constrain us. The ready-made answers that culture supplies often keep us from actively developing our own powers: "What the former age has epitomized into a formula or rule for manipulative convenience, [the mind] will lose all the good of verifying for itself" (E&L, 249). Our profound dependence on culture also subjects us to the threat of a stifling conformity: the central concern of an essay like "Self-Reliance" is the difficulty, and necessity, of thinking and acting beyond the boundaries defined by the institutions and ideas we inherit.

Ultimately, though, Emerson affirms our ability to appropriate the powers of culture to healthier ends, if we view culture not as a source of stable, codified values, but as a collection of tools, as starting

points for new action. Emerson exhorts us to seek value not in products, but in the active development of our individual powers: "the goods of fortune may come and go like summer leaves," but "[w]hat a man does, that he has" (E&L, 311). Much as James asserts that a word or idea should be viewed "less as a solution . . . than as a program for more work" (W&J, 380), so Emerson asserts that the value of ideas lies in their ability to carry us forward into new experiences: "all language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries and houses are, for conveyance, not as farms and houses are, for homestead" (E&L, 463). Emerson urges us to experiment with the vast array of ideas and activities that culture offers, so that we can discover, develop, and refine our own most vital powers. Moreover, he affirms that by acting with and against the ideas and tools we inherit, we can help create results that transcend the reality previously defined by those tools: we can, to use the central trope of his essay "Circles," "draw a new circle" beyond the limits of our previous circle. Yet, as this trope indicates, Emerson also insists that the creative power of each transformative act becomes in turn a restrictive power: each creative effort becomes part of a new "circle," a new environment that resists further transformations:

For it is the inert effort of each thought, having formed itself into a circular way of circumstance,—as, for instance, an empire, rules of an art, a local usage, a religious rite,—to heap itself on that ridge, and to solidify and hem in the life. But if the soul is quick and strong, it bursts over the boundary on all sides, and expands another orbit on the great deep, which also runs up into a high wave, with attempt to again to stop and to bind (E&L, 404).

Emerson views this inevitable limitation of our acts not as a misfortune, but as imposing the salutary necessity of continual re-creation: "the heart refuses to be imprisoned" (E&L, 404); he concludes: desire drives us ever on to new acts. It is in this repeated drama of limitation, struggle, and change, Emerson tells us, that we must seek power: "Life only avails, not the having lived. Power ceases in the instant of repose; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state" (E&L, 271).

James's pragmatism extends this Emersonian view that new acts and new truths must emerge out of the possibilities and constraints of our cultural moment. Like Foucault, James rejects the notion of absolute truth, recognizing truth wholly in terms of its material effects. Truth, James insists, does not apprehend reality in any objective sense; it is only "our belief about reality," a human description of reality: "We conceive a given reality in this way or that, to suit our purpose, and the reality submits to the conception" (W&J, 454). Truth instead measures the specific material consequences of adopting and acting on a belief: an idea that "help[s] us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience" is "true for so much, true in so far forth" (W&J, 382); truth "happens to an idea. It becomes true, is

made true, by events" (WW 430). Crucially, this definition of truth does not mean that we can simply abandon old truths or adopt our desires as true. To become accepted as true, a new idea must mediate between "new experience" and the "older stock of truths," stretching the latter "just enough to make them admit the novelty" (WW 382). Pragmatism acknowledges that the possibilities for change are tightly controlled by existing social structures—conceptual and institutional—and the power relations inherent in them. The need to mediate between older truths and new fact creates a "squeeze . . . so tight that there is little loose play for any hypothesis"; as a result, "[o]ur theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else is" (WW 463).

Yet James, like Emerson, affirms that these pervasive social constraints still allow sufficient possibilities for action and change. By arguing that truth measures an idea's ability to lead us into future circumstances in a way that satisfies our human needs, James is able to make two important, and related, arguments that defend the practical power of human agency. First, since the truth of an idea is verified by future consequences, James asserts that human actions—and the beliefs that inspire them—can literally help create the conditions that validate new truths. Unlike an absolutist view that sees truth as independent of the results of human struggle, pragmatism sees truth as inseparable from human action: "In the realm of truth-processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which redetermine the beliefs accordingly" (WW 439). Second, it follows that, in those questions which allow for competing interpretations whose truth must be deferred to future results, our moral desires are among the legitimate criteria for choosing and acting on an interpretation. In such cases, it may occur that "fate creates its own verification" (WW 337); belief inspires acts that help being about the results that in turn verify the belief. We are justified in believing in human agency to the extent that this belief is verified by the experience that our actions can help create valuable results. Indeed, in an argument that (as I discuss below) goes to the heart of the difference between pragmatism's and Foucault's attitudes toward power, James insists it is foolish to cultivate an excessive skepticism towards the practical power of our moral wills and the actions they inspire.

James here extends the attitude Emerson expresses in his essay "Fate," which confronts the determining limits that pervade nature and society, yet concludes that these limits still allow for considerable freedom. Specific limitations are continually being overcome by our human efforts, serving as the occasion for, and even the source of, new power: "Steam was, till the other day, the devil which we dreaded. Every pot made by any human potter or brasier had a hole in its cover, to let off the enemy, lest he should lift pot and roof and carry the house away" (EcL 959). The invention of the steam engine transformed this "devil" into a "god": "He could be used to lift away chain, and compel other devils, far

more reluctant and dangerous, namely, cubic miles of earth, mountains, weight or resistance of water, machinery, and the labors of all men in the world; and time he shall lengthen, and shorten space" (EcL 959). The limitations of our world, though stubborn and pervasive, are yet malleable enough to admit creative change so profound as to practically transform stern barriers such as time and space. Most importantly, Emerson insists that the creative powers we can wield within and against the limitations of our world are sufficient to our human needs:

If Fate is ore and quarry, if evil is good in the making, if limitation is power that shall be, if calamities, oppositions, and weights are wings and means,—we are reconciled.

Fate involves the melioration. No statement of the universe can have any soundness, which does not admit its ascending effort. The direction of the whole and of the parts is toward benefit, and in proportion to the health (EcL 960).

It is crucial to stress that the "melioration" Emerson describes is not a naïve assertion of human power, but rather a tough-minded attitude that sees the limitations and resistances of our world as occasions for struggle. Emerson here prefigures the attitude of "meliorism" that James advocates: in contrast to the extremes of optimism and pessimism—which argue, respectively, that the world "must and shall be" saved, and that it cannot be saved—James defines meliorism as being "contented with believing that the world *may be saved*" (WW 463–4). Meliorism affirms only the possibility that our acts may meet with success. Indeed, James explicitly argues that a melioristic belief in human agency requires the possibility of failure. Our moral judgment that one result would be better than another, and our need to believe that our actions might help realize the better result, only make sense if we believe that there is a real contingency or chance in the world, that both successes and failures are possible: meliorism insists that "shipwreck in detail, or even in the whole, is among the open possibilities" (WW 289).

Perhaps the central political benefit of pragmatism's view of power is that it encourages a practical activism—practical in its acknowledgment of the constraints on action, activist in its insistence that the most seemingly recalcitrant limit may prove chargeable. Pragmatism encourages us to accept the conditions of the present moment so that we will imagine how to transform them, so that we will view them as the materials out of which the future must be built. This practical activism is exemplified in James' discussion, in the closing lecture of *Pragmatism*, of "concretely grounded" possibilities: when we say a thing is possible, he argues, we usually mean that "some of the conditions of production of the possible thing are actually here" (WW 466). Self-consciously appropriating the religious rhetoric of the "salvation of the world," James challenges us to reconceive the possibility of moral progress in concrete, particular terms, to look at our present moment and seek, on the local level of our profes-

"Pragmatism encourages us to accept the conditions of the present moment so that we will imagine how to transform them, so that we will view them as the materials out of which the future must be built."

It Was Just a Summer Day

BY MARISA LACAGE

I was a hot July afternoon. The crowded station of Pamplona looked like a wilted garden. The usually effervescent Spaniards hardly uttered a word, and their red eyes and dragging feet were a testimony to the past week's famous festivities of San Fermín. The clattering train, vomiting fire like an infernal machine, appeared at the station, but, as if apprised at the sight of the crowd, it quieted down, came to a stop, and opened its doors, eager to swallow its human cargo.

As I stood in line to board, I reassured my boyfriend that, yes, I would call him as soon as I arrived in my hometown, Zaragoza, and as I got on the train, he kissed me good-bye. The train, full to capacity, started to move as I looked for an empty seat. There were none in the first coach. I was wondering what to do when a secret policeman came to check my identification—a routine event if one traveled in Spain during the Franco regime. He was a husky man in his forties, with a hard and impermeable expression in his otherwise handsome face. I suddenly realized that I knew him. He was a salesman who had for years supplied an exclusive line of lingerie to my parents' business, but I had never known he was also a *policía secreta*. Upon recognizing me, his face softened and he greeted me warmly. He asked about my family, and offered me a seat in the compartment he shared with another policeman; they always traveled in pairs.

"I want to show you some pictures that I took of my wife and daughter in the mountains. She just turned eighteen, like you," he said. Without hesitation, I followed him, and he introduced me to his partner, a taciturn fellow who hardly acknowledged my presence. I was happy to see this man get off the train in the next station. Once we were alone, the salesman then removed his gun and coat and placed them above us in the luggage compartment. He took some pictures out of his briefcase and, sitting down next to me, proceeded to show them to me. After showing me several photos of his family on vacation, he suddenly rose, pulled down the shade on the door and locked the door saying, "Maybe this way we can play cards without being interrupted." Without realizing what was happening, I was so startled by his actions that, just by instinct, I moved away from him. Unfortunately, he was blocking the door, so I backed up against the window, but I suddenly understood that I was cornered. The *policía secreta* seemed amused by my reaction and, as he came toward me slowly, he said: "Sweetheart, I just want a little kiss. Be nice to me." His once pleasant face had been transformed into a repulsive mask of desire. "I'll pull the alarm and the train will stop," I said, my hand already reaching for the lever. "And who will come to save you? The policeman?" He smiled ironically and said, "Come on, kitten, I only want to kiss you as I kiss you in my dreams." His wife and daughter kept smiling at me from the photographs and, as if ashamed of his actions, they had half hidden under the seat.

I felt trapped, cornered, but I was determined that he would not kiss my lips. I defended myself as if I were being raped. Red, black, and brown roses bloomed all over his pure white shirt as my face

glanced repeatedly off his chest. However, the *policía secreta* became more and more excited by my resistance, saying over and over, "You little wildcat, I'll turn you into a kitten. I'll show you what love is. I saw your boyfriend kissing you, but he is too young to know how to love. Let me love you, sweetheart." Luckily, the train arrived at the station of Tudela before he had exhausted me. He had forgotten that he was to be relieved by another policeman so, realizing his predicament, he took his gun and coat and left. As I looked from the window, I saw him at the station's platform smiling at me and waving good-bye. Seething with contempt, I turned my back to the window.

My make-up gone, my chignon now a careless ponytail, and my broken watch dangling from my arm, I rushed to the lavatory to try to compose my appearance and myself. After calming down, I began to think about the various courses of action I could take against this policeman. What power did I have? For a moment I felt happy that he hadn't been able to kiss my lips. Small victory! It didn't take long for me to realize that, although almost twenty years had passed since the end of the Civil War, the *policía secreta* was immune to any retaliation. I didn't have any power. Spain would protect him. I had no witnesses and, even if I had, they would not dare testify. The Church, as an institution, had always sided with Franco; however, I knew several nice priests. Perhaps I could at least talk to one of them? But, any priest would most likely inquire about my degree of responsibility. Perhaps I had enticed the *policía secreta* by flirting? No, speaking to a priest was out of the question. My family, then? They would believe me, no doubt, but the consequences could be disastrous. It scared me to put my parents in that situation. And the same applied to my jealous boyfriend, Pablo, who was capable of doing something crazy. Well, at least I would be able to talk about what had happened to my closest friend, María Pilar, a girl I had known since childhood. But the more I thought about it, the more clear it became to me that I could tell no one. If María Pilar should ever give away my secret, the suspicion could arise that perhaps something had happened, perhaps I was not

**"The policía secreta
was immune to any
retaliation. I didn't
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Spain would protect
him."**

**There is a kind of
physical pleasure in
resisting an iniquitous
power.**

Germaine d'Stail



telling the whole story. My reputation would be ruined with disastrous consequences should I ever decide to marry. My mind was spinning when, suddenly realizing I had arrived at Zaragoza, I took my luggage and stepped down onto the platform, but a force prevented me from leaving the station. When the train began to move again, I felt an uncontrollable urge to stop its inexorable march. That infernal machine was taking away my innocence.

Filled with sadness and indignation, I reacted with stoicism. Not resignation, no: stoicism. This was a natural reaction. After all, this was what all the textbooks of the period taught the women of Spain. When faced with adversity, we were to emulate Queen Isabel la Católica and other historical heroines like Agustina de Aragón, who had stopped the French invaders from entering Zaragoza during the Napoleonic invasion. Agustina had manned the cannon when, upon arriving with their lunch, she found all the soldiers dead. In the police state of Franco, women were to be an exemplar of sacrifice, endurance, and procreation. Women were to focus exclusively on their families. The family should be the goal of women. Women were to withstand suffering, not with displays of pain but with a smile on the face—always with a smile. I never doubted then that the generation of women who had lost fathers, husbands, boyfriends and brothers during the Civil War (1936–1939) would be able to muster a smile during the postwar period. Stoics they were. They had no choice.

Police abuse, sexual harassment, and rape are not the exclusive abuses of a dictatorship; they are universal crimes that affect all governments and all people. Yet in a democracy a victim has rights and powers, even if such powers are not always used with success. The scars I have from my ordeal have to do more with the sense of helplessness I felt, and with the denial of due process, than with the act itself. The possibility to fight back, to seek justice when your human rights have been violated, is a gift so precious that unless you have lived in a country without those rights, the gift is difficult to fully appreciate.

My experience, stored away in the cellar of my memories, came back to me years later while I was taking an English course on autobiography. I had hoped that, like wine, my memories would have aged and become smoother. I was wrong. They had turned into vinegar, and as I wrote, I tasted the pain and bitterness of the drink once more. ■

Pragmatism (continued from page 8)

sional and civic lives, possibilities for change that our actions might help realize.

It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards meliorism. Some conditions of the world's salvation are actually extant, and one can not possibly close her eyes to this fact...

Take, for example, any one of us in this room with the ideals which he cherishes and is willing to live and work for. Every such ideal realized will be one moment in the world's salvation. But these particular ideals are not bare abstract possibilities. They are grounded, they are live possibilities, for we are their live champions and pledges (467).

While Foucault describes our individual wills as so deeply implicated in a system of disciplinary power that it is hard to imagine effective resistance, pragmatism encourages us to believe that our actions might indeed make a difference, and to act on that belief.

Emerson and James are both, as Kenneth Burke argues, "amoralist" philosophers, in that they stress the practical significance of choosing different attitudes toward a reality.⁴ As outlined above, James argues that pessimistic and melioristic attitudes toward the possibilities for social change are competing beliefs between which we may legitimately choose: either one could be verified as "true" by future events, and, crucially, their verification may hinge on the actions inspired by our chosen belief. Our pessimism or belief may well be a self-fulfilling prophecy: pessimism, James argues, is a guaranteed recipe for failure, and so a faith in the possibilities of human agency is not naive, but in fact the eminently more practical choice. If we see the constraints of power that limit us, pragmatism tells us, we should also see the possibilities for powerful action within and against those limits: as Emerson puts it, "If you believe in Fate to your harm, believe it, at least, for your good" (Ed., 954). ■

⁴ Kenneth Burke, "William James, Emerson, Whittier," in *Attitudes Toward History* (Lincoln: C. Hanover, 1959 [1937]), pp. 3–31.

"In the Ranks Hard-prest": Being There, Being Human

BY PAUL BENTON

"The story about touching the hem of the robe of Jesus is more about his availability than his power."

When Pastor Connor asked if I would speak today, I happily agreed, because this month's theme—that is, serving others—seems so important to me, and because the image chosen for that theme—a cup of cold water—seems somehow so right. But then I had to think of texts, had to think of what I could say, and I began to have second thoughts. It all seemed too obvious: we should help others. Everybody, every Cub Scout, every Brownie, every six-year-old at Sunday school already knows that. Unless I have somehow acquired some special experience or expertise—which I haven't—what is there for me to say to a college community?

As sometimes happens, however, as I gave myself time to think about it, my problem gradually morphed into a potential idea. Perhaps, I thought, I don't need an advanced degree in "service." Perhaps the heart of this subject is like that cup of water: plain and ordinary and commonplace. Perhaps the heart of service isn't a certain kind of doing but a certain dimension of being, of being human, of simply being there, for and with someone else—being, in a sense, another's cup of water.

You all know Job's story: a good man suffers, and no one can help. His friends come to comfort him and eventually make fools of themselves. But let that later part go. Let's focus on this early moment. When they first arrive, Job's friends are stunned by his pain. They can do nothing. So they sit down next to him, apparently helpless, silent, doing nothing, saying nothing for a week! Job's inexplicable suffering has overwhelmed their capacity to serve him. Or so it seems.

Now think about the Gospel text. Again you know the story. Jesus is on a healing mission, with crowds pressing around him. Suddenly, in the middle of all the pushing and shoving he feels someone tentatively touch the hem of his robe. He turns and sees a woman, a woman who had been very sick just a moment before, but now she is healed, was healed, in fact, the moment she touched his robe.

So what do we have so far? A sharp contrast, right? A contrast between the powerlessness of Job's friends, on the one hand, and the power of Jesus on the other. Apparently the Son of God has so much power that without half trying he can end suffering that leaves ordinary mortals like Job's friends in silent helplessness. He's super-charged with healing energy like a gigantic spiritual battery. You just touch him and "Zap!" You're healed!

But doesn't the very obviousness of that contrast bother you a little? Doesn't that way of reading the Gospel turn it into a kind of comic book, with Super-Jesus dealing out "Zings!" and "Pows!" left and

right? That makes me suspicious, makes me suspect I'm missing something. Perhaps I should shift my perspective, reorient my assumptions here. What if the difference in status and power between Jesus and Job's friends is, at least at this moment, less important than their common immersion in the world? What if both texts represent the same thing, something like: being available to the suffering of others?

Let me try to get at what that might mean by adding a third text, a poem by the American poet Walt Whitman. During the Civil War, Whitman spent most of his time as a volunteer in the crowded, stinking, makeshift hospitals of Washington D.C., where soldiers by the tens of thousands died of dysentery and gangrene. Whitman had no training, no medicine, certainly no supernatural healing power. He could do little to end the suffering. He could only be there, sitting by the wounded and dying, reading the newspaper to one man, writing a letter home for another, holding the hand of a boy in his death spasms, offering another a sip of water—just being there, being available, opening his presence to a fellow human being.

Now that's what this wonderful poem is really about, though the setting is a little different. The speaker, the "I" of the poem, is a soldier, an infantry man in a division that's suffered heavy losses in battle that day, and now they're making a forced march, "a march in the ranks hard-prest," retreating through a dark forest at night. The soldier's unit stops for a moment at a crossroads where a small church has been converted into a field hospital. He goes inside, and in the flickering light of candles and torches he sees the wounded and dying and dead everywhere, with surgeons, scalpels and saws in hand, working hard to save lives. He hears the screams, hears the moaning, smells the stench of blood and death, then looking down he sees a pale, dying soldier at his feet, a mere boy shot in the gut, hemorrhaging severely. He bends down and tries to stop the bleeding, but it's hopeless and in any case he must move on with his unit. As he leaves to resume his march down that dark road, he exchanges a look, a "half-smile," with the dying boy. That's all.

I won't take time now to read the whole poem, though I hope you'll take it with you and spend a few minutes reflecting on it. Instead let me read the last few lines, and as I read I want you to think about what service means here. Ask yourself: would the soldier really be more Christ-like if his touch had healed the dying boy?



A chapel talk delivered October 20, 1997.

Note: Job 2: 11-13
Luke 8: 40-46
Whitman, "In the Ranks Hard-prest"

Surgeons operating, attendants holding lights, the smell of ether, the odor of blood,
The crowd, O the crowd of the bloody forms, the yard outside also fill'd,
Some on the bare ground, some on planks or stretchers, some in the death-spawn sweating,
An occasional scream or cry, the doctor's shouted oaths or calls,
The glinten of the little steel instruments catching the glint of the teethes,
These I resume as I chant, I see again the forms, I smell the odor.
Then hear outside the order given, "Fall in, my men, fall in"; But first I bend to the dying lad, his eyes open,
a half-smile gives he me, Then the eyes close, calmly close, and I speed forth to the darkness,
Resuming, marching, ever in darkness marching, on in the ranks,
The unknown road still marching.

This poem comes out of the horror of the Civil War, but it's not really about that war. This poem, like many great poems, like the Book of Job, like the Gospel stories of the life of Jesus, is about the human condition, about how one tries to live in a world where others suffer, a world through which we are marched down dark, unknown roads by forces we don't comprehend. Such a world needs surgeons, of course, surgeons who serve. But more essentially it needs the look and touch shared by these two soldiers, the gesture that says not "here's what I can do for you" but more simply "here I am," "here we are."

In that light the story about touching the hem of the robe of Jesus is more about his availability than his power. In that light even Job's friends in their helpless silence, before they get preachy, remind us that the heart of service is love; that is, carries, charity, caring; that is, being there, being with and for another, allowing our presence to mend with theirs. That sharing, that communion of the simple cup of cold water, may not in itself bring an end to suffering or hunger or war. It may not change the world, but it's at the heart of what redeems it. ■

DEAN'S COMMENTS

University life is a series of comings and goings. We are used to that with our students, but recently have experienced more than we like (of the going, anyway) with faculty. Last spring, members of the Division of Humanities were saddened by the unexpected retirement of Jack Cady, adjunct professor of English and our exemplary writer-in-residence. Over the next year, two valued members of the Religion department will enter phased retirement: Lyman Lundeen and Walt Pilgrim. Together they represent 35 years of service to PLU, and more than 55 years of teaching in Lutheran institutions of higher learning. They will be missed.

We also say good-bye this spring to Suzanne Tociszki (French) and Judy Desinges (English), who served with distinction the past several years as part-time faculty. They have been splendid teachers who gave freely of themselves to the PLU community, and we offer appreciation and thanks.

Not all is good-bye, however. Jim Albrecht (English) and Dong Xiang Warner (Chinese), in their first year as tenure-track faculty, have exhibited the excellence in teaching and in character that bode well for our future. Eric Nelson, who served for several years as a visiting professor in Classics, was the successful one among 128 candidates for a new tenure-track

position in Classics. And Earl Lovelace, whose award-winning work is excerpted here, began his work in the fall as Distinguished Writer-in-Residence (and tenure-track professor in the English department). As we say good-bye to graduates this May, we are also well-prepared to greet new students in the fall.

It is not only people who come and go around here, but ideas. The essays in this issue of *Prae*, produced under the editorial leadership of Tom Campbell (English), illustrate by their wisdom and care that not all is decided through power—or at least not a single kind of power. After all, each author is attempting not to impose upon the reader from a position of dominance, but to use the power of the pen and the power of ideas to persuade, to illuminate, to challenge, to intrigue. At its best, study in the humanities equips us with the tools of understanding and of critique, the ability to appreciate and the will to weigh carefully those ideas that compete for our attention. This issue provides another stellar example of what quality education is all about: it occurs best through active involvement with others, and at bottom it concerns (as Earl Lovelace writes) "the power to set people at liberty." I am privileged to serve with colleagues such as those represented here, and to have the opportunity to share them with you.

Updike and the Patriarchal Dilemma: A Review

BY MARK K. JENSEN

Beneath its academic-critical veneer, Mary O'Connell's recent study of John Updike's Rabbit trilogy is a heartfelt summons to American men to reconsider the price paid for cultural dominance. The author, who teaches writing and American literature in the nation's capital at George Washington University, has dedicated the volume to "Frank, Chris, Luke, and Brian," presumably the (American) males in her own life. Her message is unambiguous: If we are to get our lives in order and achieve some semblance of inner health and outward harmony, we must give up "the repression of the feminine and the suppression of the capacity to love the radically other in a patriarchal society" (147). "Killing the feminine perspective" has made it impossible for Harry "Rabbit" Angstrom and millions like him to enjoy "satisfactory human relations" and condemns them to suffer the consequences of an inward repression of the "perspective and capacities vital to resolving the problems in his life" (91). The cultural triumph of patriarchal patterns is a disaster: it has produced a "wasteland society" (201) whose losers are defined by gender (and also by race and class). The key to breaking out of this pattern, O'Connell implicitly tells us, is not revolution but an inner overcoming of the "oppositional perspective" (177) that condemns us to isolation and incompleteness.

Little is novel in this diagnosis, but it is intriguing and illuminating to see how many terms of the argument may be drawn from Updike's four novels. After all, Updike is himself scarcely an overt spokesman for feminist multiculturalism. On the contrary, he has often been upbraided for a misogynist strain in his work which disturbs even sympathetic and admiring readers like Michiko Kakutani, who denounced in the *New York Times* the "sexual clichés" that made *Brazil* (1994) an "ugly, repellent novel." In matters political, Updike's moderate conservatism has set him apart from much of the liberal intelligentsia. In *Self-Consciousness*, a volume of autobiographical essays published in 1989, Updike analyzed the roots of his resistance to embracing causes like opposition to the Vietnam War. Ultimately, his objections are metaphysical: "Down-dirty sex and the bloody mess of war and the desperate effort of faith all belonged to a dark necessary underside of reality that I felt should not be merely ignored, or risen above, or distained. These shameful things were intrinsic to life, and though I myself was somewhat squeamish about fingerpaints and spiders and tomatoes, they must be faced, it seemed to me, and even embraced" (*Self-Consciousness*, 135). In an essay from the mid-1980s on Muriel Sparks reprinted in *Odd Jobs* (1991), Updike expressed this point more abstractly: "Existence, including our own, is a mystery, and a critical attitude toward it is not fruitful" (*Odd Jobs*, 455). But Updike is nothing if not sensitive to objections to his position, and in *Self-Consciousness* he ends the

essay entitled "On Not Being a Dove" with a twenty-page *mis en abyme* more or less admitting that he has been "lucky": "My earliest sociological thought about myself had been that I was fortunate to be a boy and an American" (*Self-Consciousness*, 145). It is, then, perhaps not so much of a surprise to learn that the Rabbit novels can be fruitfully considered as an analysis of American patriarchy.

O'Connell is often persuasive. Her analysis of the information we are given about Rabbit's childhood rings true, and this reader found masterful her analysis of the significance of Marty Tidmarsh, the high school basketball coach who, as a sort of self-appointed tribal elder, imparts home truths that guide Rabbit's adolescence and early adulthood—patriarchal obiter dicta that the weakness of Rabbit's father only serves to reinforce, somehow. O'Connell sees in the character of Tidmarsh—a-hem—both an example of what is wrong with our society and a study of how this state of affairs is perpetuated. "It is Updike's substantial contribution to reveal just how intimate is the level on which male dominance is established," she remarks (71).

In O'Connell's reading, Rabbit's trail is littered with female victims. The deaths of his infant daughter in the first novel, and, in the second, of Jill whose role defies short description, are laid to his irresponsibility. Other women are "silenced" (81), and O'Connell analyzes Updike's use of narrative conventions (132) to underline the "male control of perspective" (87). These points seem tendentious when stated summarily, but are fully and fairly grounded in the text.

O'Connell's comments on the problems that beset Rabbit's relationship with his son, Nelson, are insightful—indeed, she placed Updike "in the psychological avant-garde" (188) for emphasizing the hostility of father toward son. Her analysis of the politics of race, class, and gender in *Rabbit Redux* convincingly demonstrates that in Rabbit's world "all of the males in the society, regardless of their relative

positioning on the hierarchical ladder of privilege and power and regardless of



their politics, are blindly unified in their domination of women" (159).

But Rabbit, too, is ultimately a sacrificial figure. He yields to social pressure and adopts "a prescribed identity," thus failing to achieve an "authentic self" (128). Harry Angstrom appears as a representative American man, "both the victim and the perpetrator of social definition" (129). Only occasionally does he sense that other attitudes are possible. Such moments come when he gardens; and O'Connell shows how garden motifs recur, signaling that there is, after all, a way of uniting opposites and overcoming oppositions.

Though these themes and suggestions are all convincingly grounded in the text, one is not necessarily inclined to believe that they add up to an adequate account of these novels. At her best, O'Connell acknowledges that Updike's fictions do not point to moral conclusions; they are, rather, "interrogative texts" (borrowing Alterson's term) (66). She applauds Updike for the "multiple, contradictory possibilities" she sees undermining the dominant patriarchal perspective in *Rabbit, Run* (68); but she is frustrated and sometimes impatient with the author for not unambiguously embracing her own solution to the problem.

- While Rabbit initially rejects the notion that
- Nelson is anything like him, he is extremely distressed that the boy seems to be reliving his own experience of entrapment. This is, in fact, exactly what Nelson is doing, but we are left to question whether he is entrapped by society; by *Fury* by nature; by personal history and temperamental inclination; or by some, and if so by what, combination of the above. Recent theories suggest that Nelson's conflicted inner sense is passed on to him by his absent, wounding father and causes him to relive the father's crisis. In other words, Nelson's problem, his solution, and his temperament are all part of his wounded masculine inheritance (189).

This passage reveals the difference between Updike's and O'Connell's approach (and suggests as well the extent to which Updike succeeds in making his characters seem real to readers). The first two sentences convey the tentativeness, or, looked at another way, the overdetermination of significance that results from Updike's attempt to describe and understand his characters; the last two sentences convey O'Connell's sociologically inclined impulse to diagnose and prescribe.

We have seen, though, that Updike is not attracted to nostrums for the larger ills that bedevil the human condition. This obstinacy provokes O'Connell, in her more unattractive moments, to adopt an accusatory mode: "Updike exposes Rabbit's behavior, yet, at the same time, as author, he participates in that behavior by arranging Bath's degradation; furthermore, he reinforces the fantasy by arranging it with skill" (39). This amounts to

complaining that Updike should be writing different books, and runs directly counter to Updike's aesthetic.

O'Connell continues:

- Many feminists consider pornography synonymous with exploitation; if this is so, the author's method and expertise may be at odds with his intention. This contradiction is one of several that suggest that serious, possibly insoluble, conflicts hinder the male artist in examining masculinity. Even with the best of intentions, he may reframe and redistribute the same mythologies he hopes to explore or overthrow (39).

This view, pursued to its logical conclusion, threatens to undermine art itself. The demand that art submit to ethical prescription misunderstands, it may be, the good and the beautiful. The relation of these two values, according to the aesthetic tradition to which Updike belongs, does indeed contain deep contradictions and is insolubly paradoxical. But O'Connell is rarely so uncompromising in her moral demands upon art; and even here she does not completely commit herself, adding moral and adverbial hedges: "if this is so," "may be at odds with," "possibly insoluble," "may reframe." Some critical daemon is pulling at her sleeve and she wisely gives heed to it.

John Updike and the Patriarchal Dilemma is similar to a previous study of the Rabbit novels by Dilvo L. Ristoff, a Brazilian teaching in the United States. In *Updike's America: The Presence of Contemporary American History in John Updike's Rabbit Trilogy* (1988), Ristoff argued that a preoccupation with religiously moralistic nations had tended to lead critics to overemphasize the rightness or wrongness of Rabbit's actions, when Updike's point was not a moral effort to judge a particular character but rather an attempt to clarify our understanding of the American scene. Ristoff studied the manuscripts of the first three novels, which Updike has deposited together with ancillary materials in the Houghton Library at Harvard, and shows that the lengths to which Updike has gone to incorporate actual elements of the American scene in the Rabbit novels have been extraordinary. (No doubt this effort explains in part the greater length of each successive Rabbit novel.) Ristoff succeeds in persuading the reader that Updike often intended characters like Jill, Tohero, or the black militant Sheeter as types representative of forces at work in contemporary America, and he also succeeds in persuading us that "like middle America, Rabbit remains fundamentally unchanged" (109); at least in the first three novels—and the fact that Updike has Rabbit make one last run at the conclusion of *Rabbit at Rest* surely confirms that this is also the author's view. But Updike's novels are achievements of consummate artistry that can sustain any number of interpretations, even contradictory ones. Ristoff's study is like Mary O'Connell's in this respect: however much

From Salt

BY EARL LOVELACE

"There was no natural subservience here. Nobody didn't bow down to nobody just so."

"Watch the landscape of this island," he began with the self-assured conviction that my mother couldn't stand in him. "And you know that they coulds never hold people here surrendered to unfreedom." The sky, the sea, every green leaf and tangle of vines sing freedom. Birds trisk and flimer and whistic and sing, just so a yard cock will draw up his chest and crow. Things here have their own mind. The rain decide when it going to fall. Sometimes in the middle of the day, the sky clear, you hear a rushing swooping sound and swoops it fall down. Other times it set up whole day and then you sure that now, yes, it going to fail, it just clear away. It had no brooding inscrutable wilderness here. There was no wild and passionate uproar to make people feel they is beast, to stir this great evil wickedness in their blood to make them want to go out and murder people. Maybe that madness seized Columbus and the first set of conquerors when they land here and wanted the Carib people to believe that they was gods; but, afterwards, after they settle in the island and decide that, yes, is here we going to live now, they begin to discover how hard it was to be gods.

The heat, the diseases, the weight of armour they had to carry in the hot sun, the imperial poses they had to strike, the powdered wigs to wear, the churches to build, the heathen to baptize, the illiterates to educate, the animals to tame, the numerous species of plants to name, history to write, flags to plant, parades to make, the militia to assemble, letters to write home. And all around them, this rousing greenness bursting in the wet season and another quieter shade perspiring in the dry.

On top of that they had to put up with the noise from Blackpeople. Whole night Blackpeople have their drums going as they dance in the bush. All those dances. All those lascivious bodies leaping and bending down. They couldn't see them in the dark among the shadows and trees; but, they could hear. They had to listen to them dance the Bamboula Bamboula, the Quelbay, the Manding, the Juba, the Ibo, the Pique, the Italord, the Coromanti, the Congo, the Chiffon, the Banda, the Penow, the Cherrep, the Kalinda, the Bongo. It was hard for Whitepeople. It had days they wanted to just sit down under a breadfruit tree and cool off, to reach up and pick a ripe mango off the tree and eat it. It had times they just wanted to jump into the sea and take a sea bath, to romp with a girl on a bed of dead leaves underneath the umbrellas of cocoa trees. They try, but they had it very hard. They walk a little distance and then they had to stop, perspiration soaking them, sticking their clothes to their bodies. It was so hot. They had to get these big roomy cork hats to wear to keep their brains cool. They had to get people to fan them. People to carry their swords, people to carry cushions for them to sit down on. They had to get people to beat people for them, people to dish out lashes—seventy-five, thirty-five, eighty-five. But, what else to do? People had to get

licks to keep them in line. How else they coulda carry on The Work, feeding all those people, giving them rations, putting clothes on their back. And it was hard. It was very hard to mould Negro character, to stamp out his savage tendencies.

They tried to make provisions for allowing him innocent amusement after Mass and until evening, prayers, to see that he didn't cohabit without benefit of matrimony, to lay out the work for him to do, to pass around later to see that he do it. No, really, they try. They reduced the number of lashes to twenty-five. They tried in administering the floggings to make sure and not to cause the effusion of blood or contusion; but, what else to do?

There was no natural subservience here. Nobody didn't bow down to nobody just so. To get a man to follow your instructions you had to pen him and beat him and cut off his ears or his foot when he run away. You had wan to take away his woman from him and his child. And still that fellow stand up and oppose you.

But these fellars here. These fellas was the most lawless and rebellious set of fellars they had in the Caribbean, the majority of them dangerous rebels exiled here from the other islands, men that had no care, fellars whose spout was to bust one another head, fellars who make up their mind to dead, who land on the wharf from Martinique and Grenada and St Lucia and from wherever they bring them singing:

Moomba, Moomba, your son in the grave already;
Your son in the grave already,
Take a towel and band your brily... .

singing: Thousand
Ten thousand to bar me one
Me one, me one... .

singing: When I dead bury my clothes,
I don't want no sweetman to wear my
clothes.

And it wasn't just men alone. It had women there that was even more terrible. They had to ban them from talking. They had to ban them from walking from raising up their dress tail and shaking their melodious backsides. They wasn't easy. The plantation people couldn't handle them. They beat them. They held them down and turn them over and do them whatever wickedness they could manage; but they couldn't break them.

And then it dawn on them that you can't defeat people. Then they find out that people too stupid to be defeated. They too hardened. They don't learn what you try to teach them. They don't hear you. They forget. You tell a man to do something and he tell you he forget. You tell him to shoot and he forget to load the rifle. You tell him to get up at five, and nine o'clock he now yawning and stretching; he didn't hear you; or, he hear something different to what you tell him. You is the expert, but he believe that he

Power, Politics, and Justice

BY D.W. OLNEY III

The social science literature on the subject of power is formidable. The variety of approaches is due in large part to the many reasons people have for using the concept. When we talk about power, what are we interested in? My interests here are narrow. The first is an assertion: What we believe about power is connected to what we want in the way of justice. The second is a question: How do we investigate claims about power and justice?

The connection between power and justice has always troubled political thinkers in the United States. Part of the difficulty is due to a liberal tradition shared with many other Western nations. I use the term liberal in its classic sense to denote ideas that place a cardinal value on individual rights and freedom. In this usage President Bill Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich are both liberals. Another part of the difficulty is due to a distinctly U.S. experience with power issues.

I. Our Liberal Tradition

Liberal democratic societies begin their reasoning about power with individuals. John Locke argued, back in 1689, that in order to understand power we have to consider "what state all men are naturally in": "creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection." From this assertion of original, natural equality Locke went on to several conclusions:

- In their original position all individuals are responsible for the safeguard of their rights. In a social world with organized political authority, that responsibility is lodged in a public entity, a government, that will exercise rule through the application of law. The alternative to a lawful government is the arbitrary power exercised by a king—a situation Locke likened to a state of war against individuals.
- The fundamental social problem for liberals is the threat to individual rights presented by the exercise of public power.
- The best way to restrict public power to lawful purposes is to have limited government. The chief limit on public authority was, in Locke's idea, representative democracy. (The authors of our present Constitution accepted this and added as additional limits the separation of state powers among several branches, and federalism.)

• Locke conceived of law as representing narrow but widely shared interests. He argued that the sole reason governments were formed was to protect property, both material wealth and the property one holds in one's person. All other concerns—one's thoughts, one's family, one's choices of how to conduct life,

were outside the reach of public power. These were private.

- Liberals believe capitalism is the economic system that allows the greatest number of people to be free. The political systems that join this sense of freedom with capitalism are called liberal democratic. Markets are impersonal and nonarbitrary distributors of goods, in the sense of being independent from the will of an arbitrary monarch. One's lot in life in those areas deemed private are largely due to individual conduct, what Locke called our rationality and industry. He said that God gave the world to the rational and industrious, and argued that it was OK if they kept it.

If we start thinking about power with these ideas in mind, we are firmly in the liberal tradition. As liberals, we will likely see a strong connection between power and individual freedom. For example, when presented with a simple fact, such as "Bill Gates is worth over thirty billion dollars," liberals will not jump to the conclusion that power is at stake. The liberal position is that rich people like Gates probably earned their money, since the outcomes of the market economy are basically fair. For another example, a child abused by drug-addict parents will not likely be taken from that family permanently, perhaps not even temporarily. State involvement is inherently a threat to freedom, and our legislatures and courts work with a legal code that defines us as individual bundles of rights. As complicated as such situations may be, liberals are fond of using state power to guide what are defined as fundamentally private matters.

This picture of public power, and the dichotomy between public power and private lives, has been remarkable durable in liberalism, particularly in the United States. In 1980 the country elected a president who sounded very much like Locke. Ronald Reagan declared that "government is the problem," that the national government should get out of people's lives, and generally trumpeted traditional values. He was called "the great communicator" in the press largely because he was so good at conveying these messages. In many ways Reagan himself did not live the life represented in his "morning in America" campaign for the 1984 election, but that didn't matter. Three hundred years after

Locke, the themes still formed the core of a credible political ideology.²

"What we believe about power is connected to what we want in the way of justice."

The question is posed in Steven Lukes, ed., *Power* (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1985). The book contains examples of studies in power from a variety of social-scientific and humanistic perspectives.


Lewis Hartz, in *The Liberal Tradition in America* (NY: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955), argued that Americans are uncritical idealists because we have seen that only without a feudal nation, and thus without a credible socialist alternative.



Updike (continued from page 19)

they add to our appreciation of Updike's art, they fail to account for the peculiarly deep involvement that so many readers have come to have with Rabbit Angstrom. Neither Ristoff nor O'Connell sufficiently recognize that in the end Updike is most interested not in the American scene or in Harry Angstrom's masculinity, whiteness, middle-class status, or patriarchal ideology, but in his humanness. O'Connell succeeds in showing that Updike's sympathetic portrayal of Rabbit is consistent with her analysis of the psychosocial costs of patriarchy, but she often pushes this line of argument too far and makes out to be a specifically male-patriarchal debility what is a general difficulty of human existence. When she uses Dorothy Dinnerstein's *The Mermaid and the Mongoose: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise* (1976) to argue that "the fear of union or reunion is the very source and energy of male power," she ignores the extent to which this applies to female power and, perhaps, to all sexual power. Dinnerstein specifically applies her analysis to "all of us" (49), so her argument is not patriarchy (indeed, it could even be used to support the universality of patriarchy), but O'Connell warps this approach to her own ends. As a rule, she exaggerates the amount of control over women that men have in general, and that Rabbit has in particular. The attractions of patriarchy for women (security and material rewards, for example) are underestimated or neglected as well, though they clearly influence Rabbit's mother and sister.

Occasionally the concept of patriarchy seems cobbled on, as when "the news on television, reports in the *Vit* (the newspaper Rabbit typesets), and the general gossip tell of civil rights unrest, the unsuccessful war, and the anti-Vietnam protest, and Janice's affair" in *Rabbit Redux* are said to represent aspects of "a general challenge to the tyranny of the patriarchal order" (130). In fact, as many memoirs of the sixties have shown, patriarchal tendencies were rife in the movements of the sixties, and in *Rabbit Redux* Skeeter is thoroughly imbued with them—as O'Connell herself shows in her seventh chapter. On occasion, Updike is accused of "killing" female characters ("there is no question that the author kills Rebecca" [89]), and the preface opens by noting that "six women (Ruth, Janice, Rebecca, Jill, Mary, and Peggy), all of them characters that Rabbit has loved, die literally or metaphorically in the first three novels" (ix). But these claims are exaggerated, as indeed O'Connell seems in the end to acknowledge when she writes that the metaphorically murdered Janice has "improved wonderfully over the years" (221). In fact, one has the impression that some of these claims are leftovers from an earlier, more accusatory reading of the Rabbit tetralogy, and the description of the book's genesis in the preface supports this suspicion. Somewhat surprisingly, Mary O'Connell's final judgement in *Updike and the Patriarchal Dilemma* is a hopeful, albeit qualified, blessing: the creator of Rabbit Angstrom is enrolled among "the precursors of the contemporary movement among men to reclaim their cultural inheritance as males" (237). ■



From Salt (continued from page 18)

know better than you what it is you want him to do, and he do it and he mess it up.

Four hundred years it take them to find out that you can't keep people in captivity. Four hundred years! And it didn't happen just so. People had to revolt. People had to poison people. Port-of-Spain had to burn down. A hurricane had to hit the island. Haiti had to defeat Napoleon. People had to run away up the mountains. People had to fight. And then they agree, yes. We can't hold people in captivity here.

But now they had another problem: it was not how to keep people in captivity. It was how to set people at liberty. ■

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II. Liberalism in the U.S.A.

The United States experience with liberalism has been complicated, and in many ways its core beliefs are under constant criticism. Few would argue that there are no imperfections in our society. Yet liberal ideals adapt to and acknowledge the imperfections. For example, one early concession to political reality is that individuals are rarely powerful, but groups certainly are. They can be powerful enough to be serious threats to individual rights. James Madison acknowledged this in the *Federalist Papers*, No. 10. The way he put it, factions present the greater danger to liberty, and the proposed constitution—the one we now live under—allowed factions to operate but made it unlikely one would ever win enough power to trample on the rights of others. Madison turned out to be right. Most people pursue their interests through the private groups to which they belong, and those groups are the main conduit for communicating citizens' preferences to government officials. The groups may not perfectly compete, some may be more powerful than others, but the stability and peacefulness of most political conflict in the United States demonstrates the self-regulating feature of liberalism. Interest group influence in government is the mechanism for limiting power by keeping any one group from seizing too much of it. Given these amendments about power, the liberal tenets survive the challenge.

The liberal ethos is so ingrained into our culture that we define it as the American Dream. It consists of the account of public power described above and the related beliefs about private life, such as:

- All citizens can participate equally in the economy and in politics, and can always start over if they have not succeeded. It is perhaps ironic that we question this idea more intensely in an era when it is closer to the truth. When I was growing up, say in the early 1950s, women and minorities were less able to participate in the economy and in politics. Where something like one third of adult Americans were then realistically able to aspire to this tenet of the Dream, perhaps two-thirds are now.
- All citizens have a reasonable chance of achieving their expectations. One simple way to make sense of this is to look up median household income in the United States (right now it is about \$38,500) and ask whether that is in line with the expectations of most citizens. A family will find it difficult to purchase a house, health insurance, and a car on that income, let alone college for the kids and occasional vacations.
- Success (and failure) is largely due to factors under the control of each individual. Bill Gates worked smarter and harder than most other people; he found luck rather than it finding him. Similarly, losers did something unwise somewhere along the line. My dear nephew, for example, should have never tried cocaine. He should be finishing medical school right now, instead of reporting to his probation officer.

- Success is a sign of virtue; failure is a sign of sin. The poor agree more frequently than do the nonpoor that poor women have babies to collect more welfare and that most welfare recipients take advantage of the system. The success of recent immigrant Asian-Americans is accompanied by a widespread belief that they work harder and are willing to sacrifice for families and business more so than other Americans.²

Taken as a whole, these are beliefs about justice in our world. The ideology underlies a claim that the distribution of goods in the United States is fundamentally just.

It is also a set of beliefs about power. The notion that the distribution of goods is a function of power is an attack on the fundamental beliefs of the American Dream and of liberalism. Perhaps most significant about the list is that the core beliefs concern the private world. There is a simple reason why. Liberalism's core values are about the dangers of and limits to the exercise of public power. In our everyday lives we feel coerced, but not just by public power. More frequently, it is by events in the private realm. And liberal beliefs may require that we do not interpret such situations as examples of the operation of power.

Our current trend in welfare reform policies seems to be an example of the enduring strength of liberalism. The underlying assumption of the federal reforms is that welfare programs shielded people from the incentives offered by labor markets. Most of the adults receiving welfare must be gainfully employed or in training programs soon, or the states that administer the programs will lose some of their budgets. A friend in charge of collecting the relevant statistics for the state of Washington tells me that a majority of these people have serious psychiatric and physical disabilities, and that the overwhelming majority have extremely limited skills. But the official interpretation is that market incentives will help these people stand on their own feet, and become hard-working virtuous citizens. A member of our governor's staff made it clear to my friend that his numbers and doubts are unwelcome.

III. Justice and Power

There is a thin line between social theory—reasoned arguments about the distribution of power and justice—and ideology, the largely uncritically held ideas that help believers make sense of their world. If questions about justice turn into questions about the distribution of power, do our theories help us see the world more clearly? How will we know if they do?

"The connection between power and justice has always troubled political thinkers in the United States."

²The list is from Jennifer L. Hochschild, *Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 26–34.



**Equality is what does
not exist among
mortals.**

E. E. Cummings

Let me start with a brief example. I grew up in a raisin country in California's Central Valley. Migrant workers, mostly Latino, picked the grapes and boxed the raisins. They lived in camps that didn't include much more than huts arranged around a well. Managers of the largest farms in the area had deputy sheriff badges in their wallets. It was clear who had the money and who didn't, and when members of the two groups encountered each other it was clear who was closest to public authority.

To a young boy wondering out loud about these clear facts and about the possibilities of a more equal distribution of riches,¹ a mother had a clear answer. "Why should these Mexicans have the same things as your father, who went to Stanford and worked so hard for everything we have?" She added persuasive evidence: "Camillo Cisneros," who owned the neighboring farm, "used to pick grapes. He saved his money and bought a farm, and now his children go to school with you." It was true. Mike Cisneros was even valedictorian for the eighth grade class. The story denied the differences were about power. The differences were about virtue. Hard-working people were able to get nice homes. The world is a fair place if you play by the rules.

Even a little boy's questions about justice are also questions about power. To deny injustice is to deny that power is relevant to understanding the situation.

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that post-1960 feminism in the United States is precisely about the same core belief: the dichotomy between the public and the private, and what the idea does to our notions of justice and power.² The concept *patriarchy* means the rule of men, and analysis of patriarchy in our society requires asking why men have higher incomes, more leadership roles, fewer domestic duties, and so on. In the public realm it is easy to study career paths of politicians to find out what enables so many men to become judges, legislators, mayors, etc. Patriarchy is also used to denote the power relations that result in women more frequently working in the privacy of a home, less frequently reaching the top career levels in organizations, more frequently experiencing reduced living standards as a result of divorce, and other differences in roles among males and females. Now, a concept that does so many things is probably too broad to be analytically rigorous. To use the definitions above, it sounds like ideology as much as social theory. I use it here as a starting place for asking questions about justice.

Feminists have pointed out that the public/private distinction is more complicated than in the classic liberal case. In its traditional guise the public means government, and the private means civil society—where you work, where you play, where you go to church, and other nongovernmental groups to which you may belong. Yet most so-called private organizations are led by males. An additional distinction needs to be made: The private sphere is domestic, in a home away from the pressures of the outside world. Using this distinction, we can ask why certain roles are held primarily by males, and why some are held primarily by females. In so doing we are challenging the traditional liberal notion of

power. To offer one example: In 1965 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a state may not deny married women access to contraception, since that was within the realm of their private affairs. [Grindahl v. Connecticut (381 US 479 [1965])]. This appeared to a victory for advocates of women's rights, yet it also laid down a barrier at the front door of every home: the state may not enter the home to decide how people should live there. For reformers interested in curbing domestic violence or equalizing the outcomes of divorce and child custody disputes, the barrier is formidable. Justice in the home is mostly a matter to be worked out within each family.

This implies that liberalism does not ask about power relations in areas where traditional, even preliberal values are widely held. It is likely that the idea of women having a primarily domestic role is thousands of years old.³

Many liberals have acknowledged that power and justice are inadequately accounted for in mainstream theory. In *A Theory of Justice* (1971) John Rawls aimed at finding a way to make sense of public policy during the civil rights era. The book proposed an additional axiom for liberalism: That we judge social and economic inequalities by whether they confer most of their benefits on the least advantaged members of society, and that we judge positions in organizations on whether they are equally open to all. Rawls was obviously trying to inject a sense of equality of outcomes into a liberalism traditionally focused on equality of process, and a great number of critics responded. It reinvigorated a debate on liberalism that is still underway. Perhaps the most widely read rejection of Rawls' position is Robert Nozick, whose *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (1974) essentially endorsed Locke's original position, updated for the late twentieth century.

Nozilberals such as Marxists have always challenged liberal notions of power and justice. Instead of the individual units of analysis employed by liberals, Marxists begin by recognizing classes and their effects on the distribution of power. Marx asserted that progress in history is driven by class conflict. Classes fight over the right to seize and dispose of wealth, and their struggles bring about successive revolutions.

Contemporary class analysts challenge the liberal distinction between public and private by claiming that economic power is the chief form of social conflict. For example, William Domhoff argues, in *The Power Elite and the State* (1990), that public policy outcomes are largely the result of divisions within a capitalist class. In short, business interests exert power in politics and in the popular ideology, and have successfully limited the range of equality-oriented public policies in the United States.

¹ These questions were inspired by my fifth-grade teacher, Mr. Carlson.

² See Camille Paglia, "Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy," in Philip Pettit, ed., *Contemporary Political Theory* (Baltimore: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 118-32.

³ For an analysis of how this has affected the ideas of liberal and preliberal thinkers, see Susan Müller-Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1979). See also her analysis of the public/private dichotomy in *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

continued ▶



He argues that although conservatives use the language of minimal government, they endorse a strong state that is able to limit the political power of lower classes. An important recent trend in class analysis is to recognize the special role of state institutions. Theda Skocpol argues, in *Social Policy in the United States* (1995) that while state structure hampered social democratic policies in the early part of the century, more recent political structures have encouraged and responded to broad alliances of citizens who want more equalitarian social policies. One obvious conclusion from this work is that social policies can change if large numbers of people recognize and organize around shared class interests. Control over the levers of power can be contested—if large numbers of citizens decide to challenge mainstream notions of justice and power.

IV. Coping with Many Perspectives

These different approaches to the study of power are evidence that reasonable people will disagree on how to go about it. Important consequences follow from a choice of perspective. Our ways of seeing power are also ways of not seeing. A focus on class helps us see broad trends in the distribution of social goods, but also helps us to not see individuals. Class theorists are generally willing to claim that individuals don't understand their own ideas, and may have to be improved or reeducated through the exercise of power. Liberal individualism helps us comprehend the strong attachment humans have to a sense of dignity and self-determination, but it fails us to see impersonal power exercised by institutions. Liberal theorists are generally willing to endorse market distributions of social goods as just, even if that means a substantial proportion of citizens live in poverty.

Our choice of how to understand power is connected to some kind of purpose. Among academics the fashion is to advocate greater freedom, often connected to a sense of justice. The degree of need for justice and the consequences for power (in the state, in the family, in work organizations) will certainly be subjects of continued debate. The late twentieth-century attachment to liberal democracy is a recent one, and there is no reason to think the antiliberal trends of the last century are gone for good. Francis Fukuyama disagrees with this judgment in an article entitled *The End of History* (1989), in which he argued that liberalism has now vanquished all competing ideologies. Nationalism and religion are but two possible sources of a new round of collectivism that may threaten a broadening appreciation of the forms and consequences of social power.

While writing the notes for this section I read of the recent death of Jean Pasqualini, who wrote about his imprisonment in Maoist China. The book was *Prisoner of Mao*, which he wrote under the name Bao Ruo-Wang (1976). He was sentenced to "reform through labor" because of alleged counterrevolutionary activities (which means whatever one's accusers want it to mean). His treatment included daily self-criticisms and confessions, and his book describes a state of mind in which he lost his personhood, his

inner thinking life. He came to believe what his guards told him to believe. The dystopias described by such authors as George Orwell in *1984* (1948) were fantasies—this really happened.

The multiple perspectives reviewed above are not a sign that conclusions are impossible. They are a sign that we need to talk. If injustice turns out to be those inadequacies in our practices, judged by our own ideas, we should talk about our ideas.

V. Some Advice for Asking Questions about Justice and Power

How do we make sense of a claim about power or justice? How do we start thinking about it?

It seems a fact of human nature that we walk around with considered notions of justice. We learn them at parents' knees, in families, on playgrounds, in schools, in churches, and perhaps in universities. They are the result of a lifetime of experience, direct and vicarious, with justice situations. Justice situations are simply those events where we have a sense that something is right, or wrong. A starting point for understanding the content of these ideas is when something doesn't seem quite right. Why do we think an outcome is wrong? How did we reach that conclusion? That is the beginning of the study of justice. As I have tried to argue above, it is difficult to answer such questions without some assertions about power—whether we mean its uses or its alleged absence in a justice situation.

The recent meeting of the three-quarters of a million "Promise Keepers" on the Capitol Mall was such an event for many Americans. It was an event that, through the media and among friends, we were asked to have an opinion about what it meant. Many saw it was a case where power was at stake, for instance in the criticisms that the gathering was politically conservative. People usually arrive at such conclusions by way of a loose list of reasons for why we think something is right or wrong, or why power and justice are at stake. This amounts to categorizing an event according to our existing ideas about justice.

A systematic attempt to analyze justice may require one to actively construct a set of widely accepted claims about justice, and then proceed to find apparent conflicts between them. A coherent theory is one that passes the test of explaining apparent conflicts between statements and effectively accounts for new situations.

For example, a widely held tenet among liberals is that one's entitlements—private property, the liberty of a law-abiding citizen, a profit earned from a risky investment—should not be taken without their consent. Another widely held but potentially conflicting tenet is that the majority of citizens should rule in public policy questions. Imagine that the Congress or a state enacts a progressive income tax, one that takes a higher percentage of income from higher income people. A progressive income tax disliked by a person in a higher income bracket provides us with an actual conflict between the two tenets. Our explanations for why a particular tax policy is just should provide a satisfactory resolution to the apparent conflict without our having to

An earthly kingdom cannot exist without inequality of persons.
Some must be free,
some serve,
rulers, some subjects.

Martin Luther

abandon one of the original tenets. This will involve examining claims about why one outcome is more just than another, and why the conception of power connected to each claim about justice is the best reading of the situation. There is no magic for arriving at a consensus. If consensus is not possible, disagreement remains.

Affirmative action (AA) policies are a current example of a justice issue that is connected to power issues. We are divided as a nation, with most whites believing that AA is unfair, and most blacks believing that without AA outcomes will be unfair. The situation should not, following this analysis, be decided simply by a matter of a vote that registers the weight of current opinion. The work of thinking through the tenets at stake, and why a particular policy is satisfactory without abandoning the original tenets, is tedious. Consensus will not come from citing single events, or giving single reasons why a policy seems fair or unfair. A consensus takes a lot of work. It requires a focus on justice and power, and again, there is no magic for arriving at a consensus.

It might not be much, but this is a method that enables people to address collective issues while retaining the liberal tenets which support widespread participation in discussions about justice and power. I think it is one of the big reasons the university is here. ♦

enriches their perceptions as readers, as designers, and as writers.

Thomas J. Campbell

Review of *Planned Care: A Memoir*, by Mark Doty. In *Literary Annual* (1997). Pasadena: Salem Press, 1997. 368-72.

A review of Mark Doty's *Luminous AIDS memoir*—a compendium of journals, letters, and meditations, in which the award-winning poet writes his way back from the grief of losing his partner in 1994. By turns angry and tender, defiant and remorseful, this is both a radiant work of remembrance and a moving narrative of spiritual transcendence.

Mary Jane Haesig

"Preaching the Catechism: A Transformational Enterprise." *Dialog* 36.2 (Spring 1997): 180-6.

This article examines the Lutheran reformation's understanding of preaching on the catechism (*The Catechisms*, *Apostle's Creed*, Lord's Prayer, and sacraments). Preaching and hearing the catechism gets the true function of catechetical material right. The catechism is a form of proclamation—the way to proclaim the Christian understanding of God and how God deals with humans. Preaching the catechism intends to transform listeners by telling them that the fundamental terms of their existence have changed. The article contrasts Luther's understanding with several misconceptions plaguing catechetical preaching. One misconception was (and is) that preaching the catechism is meant primarily to teach and convey information. Another misconception sees the primary reason for preaching the catechism as to improve the moral level of the listeners. Still another misconception is that the catechism replaces or competes with scripture. Book reviews in *Lutheran Quarterly*, *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, and *Sometime Century Journal*.

Sharon Janssen

"Why Do Books Fall in Love? Man and Microbes: Disavowement As On-Line Journal for the Analysis of the Present 5" (Spring 1997).

This essay describes my theories of teaching letterpress printing and fine bookmaking as a liberal art. I explain that, while letterpress is an obscure technology for commercial print production, it offers a valuable and memorable pedagogical approach to teaching principles of typography. It enables students to encounter and literally to manipulate the ways in which a text's visual presentation helps to shape its meaning, an encounter that

in the past year I even found myself fighting to save my son, and I began to fear that I would lose him too. It was this last desperate battle that led me to try to figure out just why it is that we may even fall in love with their computers.

Family Liked 1996: My Mother's Recipes

In *The Kitchen Window: Women Explore the Intimate Meanings of Food and Cooking*. Arlene Volki Ardath, ed. New York: Beacon Press, 1997. 36-64.

It was to tell my mother she was an accomplished writer, she would deny it. Concerned about her grammar, her spelling, and her punctuation, my mother has apologized about her writing in every letter she has ever sent me. Although the letters she writes to me are her most frequent compositions, her special grace is the recipe. For more, a recipe is a straightforward exercise in giving directions. Yet for my mother a recipe presents an opportunity to experiment with composing as well as cooking. Her recipes are exercises in narration, description, analysis, even argument. For me, they raise questions about texts and context, about text and subject, about textual authority and textual subversion. They are like nothing Betty Crocker ever imagined.

Dangerous Talk and Strange Behavior: Women and Popular Resistance to the Reforms of Henry VIII. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

As the title suggests, this book explores the roles of women in a period remarkable for religious, political, institutional, and social change. In *Dangerous Talk and Strange Behavior*, I explore a wide range of politically motivated activity undertaken by women from across a broad spectrum of Tudor society. As a way of focusing this discussion, I concentrate on the cases of seven female subjects charged with the crime of treason: Margaret Cheyne, who was executed for the part she played in a failed rebellion; Elizabeth Barton, for her prophecies against Henry VIII's divorce; Elizabeth Wood, for spreading "treasonous rumors" about the king and Mabel Brigger, for a "black fit"; she directed against the king. Their stories are used as detailed case studies around which to organize a wider discussion of the types of political activities undertaken by women, for many of whom the extant records are not so complete.

My aim has been to explore in fully as possible particular

women's acts of protest and resistance and analyze here, why, and when these sorts of activities were judged to threaten the peace and order of the realm.

The presence of so many women in the popular resistance to Henry VIII's reforms has largely overlooked, and my aim here is to place these stories once more within the larger narrative of political and social turmoil during the period.

Lisa Mervin

"Of One Blood: Reimagining American Genealogy in Proline Hopkins's *Controlling Forces*." In *Speaking the Other Self: American Women Writers*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1997. 117-43.

"Slave Narratives." Encyclopedia of Feminist Literary Theory. New York: Garland, 1997. 373-78.

Patricia O'Connell Killen

Finding Our Voices: Women, Writers, and Faith. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997.

This book invites readers into an extended reflection on the question: what is the invitation to women contained in the experience of an once-longing for God and being deeply disillusioned with the Christian heritage? Using stories of biblical and historical women, the biblical theology of wisdom, and feminist developmental theory, the book explores women's experiences of simultaneous desire and disillusionment and suggests possibilities for newness. The intended audience is women in Christian churches who suffer from the overwhelming and contradictions of their denominations but who are unwilling to give up the conviction that the promises of Jesus for fullness of life are for women too.

Marisa Lacabe

Al etiende José Luis Castillo-Puerto. *La Trilogía de la liberación*. Servicio de Publicaciones, Universidad de Murcia, 1997. 158 pages.

The main focus of this study is to analyse the techniques used by the author to integrate the formal and thematic elements in order to show the cohesion unity of form and content. The Trilogía consists essentially of its protagonist's retrospective attempt to free himself of the guilt and terrors of his childhood memories during the Spanish Civil War. With a psychological perspective, based on Jung, Freud and Hillman, I analyse the character's fragmented personality and his quest for wholeness. To

Recent Humanities Publications

Denis G. Arnold

"Interpretation and Its Objects." *Journal of Philosophical Research* 22 (1997).

Megan Benton

"One Many Books: Book Ownership and Cultural Identity in the 1920s." *American Quarterly* 49 (June 1997): 268-97.

This essay explores the cultural uses and significance of book ownership in America in the 1920s. It discusses the unabashed linkage between books and "better homes," between books and the so-called good life. Finally first and others saw the merits of owning books, even if they were never actually read, conveying the witty message that one could use books to construct a cultural and personal identity for others to perceive. Others, however, denounced such proclivities as "domestic bookishness." They

scorned as "bookish bubbish" the press industry with which many ordinary Americans explored the cultural and material aspects of books for purposes of home decor, social performance, and business success.

"Learning Letterpress at the Elliott Press." *American Printer Journal* 161 (January 1997): 33-35.

This essay describes my theories of teaching letterpress printing and fine bookmaking as a liberal art. I explain that, while letterpress is an obscure technology for commercial print production, it offers a valuable and memorable pedagogical approach to teaching principles of typography. It enables students to encounter and literally to manipulate the ways in which a text's visual presentation helps to shape its meaning, an encounter that

demonstrate this, I concentrate on the relationship of all thematic lines to the main theme: how all themes converge in the center—the search for identity of the protagonist. I examine the role of memory, which includes the function of time, space, and point of view; specifically, the device of *time shift*, time as space, psychological time, and the unfolding of the self in multiple I's, facilitated by the device of the interior monologue.

This study also examines altitude as interior space. The crucial role that the death of the mother—that empty space—plays in the lost identity of the protagonist. Additionally, the treatment and function of geographical space as the roots that tie man to his land are measured. In this sense, space is an indispensable part of the self, and when erased, man will feel alienated and fragmented. Finally, I analyze the structural function of language: the obscene and the lyrical, and the use of humor as an affirmation of life.

Jon J. Norby

"A Member of the Ray Rogers Bikers Club Is Expected to Follow the Rules Faithfully," Special Communications to the Journal of Forensic Sciences 42:6 (November 1997): 1195-97. After recounting a painful childhood episode when the rules of the Ray Rogers Club were discovered to be in irreconcilable conflict, this essay goes on to examine the contemporary ethics of forensic science. Good science depends upon good scientists, and the best science requires a rigorous, free, and responsible thinking that recognizes no values-morality. The "rules" rest upon prior agreements about what is good, and true, and these need careful examination by the "rules." Only then do the rational methods of science lead off outlines and blustery happy trails to a clear, consistent, uniform-ethical code for forensic science.

Paul O. Ingram

Meeting With the One: A Theology of Religious Experience. New York: Continuum, 1995. Meeting With the One appropriates the Zen Buddhist pictures of Zen Buddhist meditational practice as a moving metaphor through which to reflect theologically on some contemporary religious issues that challenge the faith of all seriously religious people in this post-modern world. The One, a symbol of the sacred with which all religious humans would through the roles of their

own religious Ways, is used as a lens through which to focus our ways of knowing and how one might conceive and experience the sacred in a religiously plural world: the nature and practice of interreligious dialogue; environmental issues and the liberation of nature; the liberation of women and issues of liberation from political and economic oppression; and the "final liberation" from death with which all religious Ways must deal. The book explores a new genre of religious writing based on years of reflection as an historian of religions on the world's religious Ways, but which approaches these Ways with the theological questions which arise in Western Christian experience. The book's goal is to help readers reflect on their own faith and practice within the wider context of the world religions. In other words, history of religions is appropriated as a theological discipline intended to help Christians and non-Christians advance in their own faith journey.

"Reflections on Buddhist-Christian Dialogue and the Liberation of Women," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 17 (1997): 49-60. The liberation of women engenders other forms of liberation—for both women and men. At their core neither Buddhist nor Christian teachings are patriarchal, but both have been shaped by institutions that are patriarchal. These traditions must be reshaped to more faithfully reflect their egalitarian core teachings. Interreligious dialogue that focuses on Buddhist and Christian feminist deconstruction and reconstruction of their respective religious traditions is an effective way to aid in this reshaping.

"The Jeweled Net of Nāmarūpa: In Buddhism and Ecology," Mary Evelyn Tucker and Duncan Robson Williams, eds. Cambridge: Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions, 1997. 71-86. This essay's thesis is that ecological encounter with Buddhist tradition—in this case illustrated by the esoteric teachings of the Buddhist monk Kukai (774-835)—and Western ecological models of reality, as seen emerging in the natural sciences and Christian process theology, may engender an already emerging global vision through which to refugee and resolve the current ecological crisis. The essay argues that what is at stake is nothing less than the liberation of life.

David Seal

"Initiation Right: Giving First-Year Students What They Deserve," College Teaching 45:2 (Spring 1997).

First-year students are too busy learning the formal system of higher education to worry much about creativity. The cognitive psychologist Howard Gardner argues that about four age 8 or 10 to 16, students are engaged in a "lateral stage" defined by a preoccupation with the need to learn systems. They're outgrowing their childhood creativity; the formalities of the world, from software to shoe styles to syllabi, now absorb their energies. Yet professors may not be able to compel creativity; but we might be able to invoke it, and not simply defend our own breeding systems. Taking a cue from the depth psychologist Robert Sardella, we can distinguish two roles we are called upon to play in class: The more familiar "professional ego" role, the Master of a particular discipline and of the ritual space in which it is performed; and the more volatile and, per creative "L" the tantalizing Deconstructionist. Neither is a role in which we ought to reside too long. The real "professor" is the interplay in the minds of the students, between those two roles.

Susanne Toczyrski

"Wolfgang Isermar—an-sicht: -Rousseau on Art and Politics/avant-Du La Lettre A D'Alémbert," Mélissa Bluteau, ed. Femmes Libres, no. 6. Ottawa: Femmes Libres, 1997.

Shortly after completing his *Lettre A D'Alémbert*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau put the final touches on his most successful novel, *Jane, Ou La Nouvelle Héloïse*. In both these texts, Rousseau is particularly concerned about the nature of spectacle and the dangers spectacles pose both to the character of *Werther* reveals himself to be particularly competent—and deadly—in the staging of spectacles for the public good; however, his most important project, the spectacle of a virtuous Julie living in the gaze of her former lover *Werther*, ultimately fails, and Julie dies a particularly spectacular death. Hence, grossly misjudging the salatory nature of the spectacle, the atheist *Werther* wielded the power of life and death, losing his beloved sponsor on the process.

Rousseau's answers for the power of spectacle in the *Lettre* thus informs the entire conception of his novel *Jane*.

"Ce dont l'esprit est capable:

Beauty and Truth in Madeleine de Scudéry's *Les Femmes Illustres*," *Annales d'Histoire*, François Lagardère, ed. Paris: PFSCL/Schöller, 1997. 197-203.

The culture of seventeenth-century France represented a spiritual reaction against the less cultivated, more aggressive tendencies displayed by the *beautés amoureuses* of *Honoré IV*. Not surprisingly, the subject of beauty in all of its myriad forms figured prominently among the favorite topics of discussion in the salons, as the women who led the gatherings felt the need to enlarge the scope of accepted notions of feminine beauty, most particularly in the domain of *belle lettres*. *Les Femmes Illustres*, Madeleine de Scudéry's book of biographies by famous historical women, attempts to locate the source of feminine beauty not in physical attributes but rather in women's project to exercise their minds (*esprits*) and in the domain of writing. Truth takes precedence over beauty, as all references to physical attributes are shunted into the liminal spaces of the text. *Les Femmes Illustres* itself serves as an example of the very project it promotes: women's quest for spiritual beauty.

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